Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 
Illustrations

Introduction
President Obama stated that the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan is the greatest threat to U.S. security and the military's top overseas priority. 1 The important task of winning the wars in the Middle East coupled with the Department of Defense's (DoD) ongoing fiscal challenges make it more important than ever for each of the Services to work together to maximize combat effectiveness as a Joint team. The United States Air Force (USAF) vision statement spells out the Air Force's intent to achieve this goal:
To be a trusted and reliable joint partner with our sister services known for integrity in all of our activities, including supporting the joint mission first and foremost. We will provide compelling air, space, and cyber capabilities for use by the combatant commanders. We will excel as stewards of all Air Force resources in service to the American people, while providing precise and reliable Global Vigilance, Reach and Power for the Nation. is an indispensable part of all meaningful relationships. However, leaders sometimes overlook the influence of trust because there is no obvious means of measuring it or its bottom-line impact. 5 But the fact that trust is difficult to measure does not diminish its importance. In a profession where people must routinely put their lives in someone else's hands, trust is foundational.
While the CSAF's second priority also includes partnering with the Coalition team, this paper will focus specifically on trust among the Air Force and the rest of Joint team. There was significantly more data on relationships between the U.S. Services that spanned a longer time period.
Two key assumptions were made during this study. 6 The survey assessed how Joint and Air
Force leaders view the Air Force's performance in 13 Core Functions, which are discussed in the next chapter.
The second assumption made in this paper is that all the Services are interested in increasing Joint combat capability and will work to that end. Many airmen were skeptical about the validity of this assumption. Some interviewees suggested land forces would not be so amenable and are simply exploiting their time in the limelight as some perceive the Air Force did in the 1990s during the Persian Gulf and Kosovo wars, where airpower played a larger role than ever before.
While the DoD offers an interesting environment in which to study Machiavellian power politics, the authors contend that even zealots within each of the Services would eventually admit they depend on each other to win. Airmen realize boots on the ground are necessary, especially in counter-insurgency fights such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other services are no less aware that air, space and cyber superiority are prerequisites for nearly any type of operation they are tasked to conduct. The Services are interdependent and as long as that is true, increasing trust is clearly in everyone's best interest.
Given those assumptions, this paper investigates several areas identified in the survey that suggest insufficient trust exists between the Air Force and its sister Services. Trust is deconstructed, first into two parts, cognitive and affective trust, before discussing five factors that influence both types of trust. Since trust is difficult to measure, it is critical to understand the influencing factors so effort can be applied strategically to areas that will produce the desired effect. Finally, the last section of the paper offers recommendations, which if applied in a way that attacks the entire problem, can help strengthen trust between the Air Force and the rest of the Joint team. 6 Specific data from the Combatant Commander Surveys may be requested from the SECAF/CSAF Executive Action Group (HAF/CX).
Notes
Identifying Areas for Improvement in Joint Partnering
Combatant Commander Survey
The HAF/CX Joint Partnership survey was sent to ten CCDRs, their Air Component commanders, and all MAJCOM and NAF commanders, as well as six retired lieutenant general senior mentors. Twenty-seven of 33 surveys were returned, with 8 of 10 CCDRs responding. The 13 survey categories were as follows:
1.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Agile Combat Support 2.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Air Superiority 3.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate capability to Build Partnerships 4.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate capability Command and Control 5.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Cyberspace Superiority 6.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Global Integrated ISR 7.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Global Precision Attack 8.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Nuclear Deterrence Operations 9.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Personnel Recovery Operations 10.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Rapid Global Mobility 11.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Space Superiority 12.
In my theater, the USAF provides adequate Special Operations capability 13.
Does the USAF organize, train and equip appropriately to present forces to your command?
Respondents, all 3-and 4-star generals, were also provided an area at the end of each category to write-in additional comments. These comments were the most revealing part of the survey because many of them pointed to an insufficient level of trust between the Services. For example, six respondents criticized the Agile Combat Support mission area for not adapting deployment policy and training to the current fight. Three respondents explained that even when co-located on the same base, the services tend to segregate themselves and invest in redundant facilities and functions. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) was also heavily criticized. One-third of the respondents (11) commented their ISR needs were not being met and several implied they thought the reasons for it had nothing to do with high operations tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan. The respondents used many examples to illustrate points and later in this paper some of those examples are analyzed. 
Notes
1 The replies to this survey were provided with the understanding that they were for the SecAF and CSAF to use in evaluating the performance of the Air Force. Making the data nonattributable would be nearly impossible and releasing these surveys in their entirety or even partially would be detrimental to future efforts to obtain candid feedback from these leaders.
Trust Deconstructed
The military context, in many ways, is the ultimate forum for issues of trust because it encompasses the highest forms of risk, vulnerability and uncertainty. Risks are high because the consequences of failure are great -usually involving life and death. The services depend on each other to mitigate these huge risks. The risks involved make trust absolutely essential.
Without trust, interdependence will not work. People consider these two types of trust independently. 2 To illustrate the point, imagine buying a used car. The objective is to get a high-quality car at the lowest cost. Checking under the hood and taking a test drive can verify that the car is in good condition. This verification mechanism serves to build cognitive trust. However, the salesman's objective is to make as much money as possible on the sale. Since the buyer's and seller's interests are opposed, building affective trust is difficult. This is a situation where cognitive trust is high but affective trust is low. and CAOC believe that addressing airpower integration into the Joint fight will take much more.
When surveyed on how to fix the situation, the most frequent response was, "Create a culture in the USAF truly valuing operational level experience." 6 A perception exists within the Air Force that officers with operational level experience get passed over, while those who get promoted to fill senior Air Force operational level positions have followed a career track emphasizing Air
Force unit command and having limited operational level experience. Operational-level assignments seem to fall below many other higher priorities. Professional
Military Education (PME) in-residence is important to an officer's chances for promotion.
Squadron, group and wing commands are also important for officers who aspire to higher grades.
A Joint assignment is required for officers before they can be considered for flag rank. These "requirements" leave little time to fit an operational-level assignment into a future senior leader's career. This approach to force development tends to be myopic because it focuses on the ways, not the ends and this inevitably leads to disconnects.
First, focusing on unit command tends to build an officer's expertise in one domain -air, space or cyber. Joint assignments often require an airman who understands the entire Air Force and all the domains in which it operates. The operational-level is the best place to get this multidomain warfighting expertise. Therefore, any long-term force development strategy should include operational-level assignments as an important part of future leader development.
Second, PME students, those in Joint billets and many commanders will not deploy during their assignments. This has led to a situation where an in-garrison position often looks better to a promotion board than a deployed, warfighting, operational-level assignment. The system is unintentionally keeping its best people out of the fight. That in turn may be creating airmen who are ill-prepared to be Joint Task Force or Combatant Commanders and fill key joint staff positions. 8 Expertise is an important part of trust and creating expertise takes a long-term strategic force development plan with concrete objectives and active management.
Perceptions of performance
Expertise and performance go hand-in-hand. Expertise is 'knowing what to do.'
Performance is the application of expertise to a job. One area where the Air Force has the most expertise of any government agency is Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) but the Air Force lost a Government Accountability Office (GAO)-backed bid to be the Executive Agent (EA) for medium-altitude UAS. 9 Since the Air Force has the expertise to perform this role, it's possible that a perception of poor performance is the cause of the decision.
Demand for UASs in Iraq and Afghanistan has been extremely high and the Air Force has had trouble meeting it. Even though the Air Force has procured more UASs than the DoD official requirement allows, the Air Force draws fire for not ramping up the capability fast enough. 10 This high demand has forced an emphasis on prioritization and created anecdotal accounts of a UAS being "pulled" from a ground unit commander. Although the priorities are set by the Joint Force Commander, not the Air Component, the Air Force takes the blame for "not being there." These experiences have left some commanders with a poor opinion of the Air Force's performance.
To obtain as much utility as possible from every available UAS, the Air Force developed a concept of operations which keeps the maximum number of UASs deployed at all times. It also minimizes the deployed footprint and maximizes flexibility.
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The Army UAS concept of operations is much different. It assigns UAS to individual commanders who can use them at their discretion. This approach has a disadvantage in that it requires approximately three times as many UASs and three times as many personnel to do the same job the Air Force concept accomplishes. 12 The Army concept has a critical advantage in that it doesn't require trust between Services because there is no interdependence.
The Air Force believes it has a better operational concept which saves taxpayer money and uses assets more efficiently, but without the perception of ability to perform the mission effectively, insufficient trust will not allow the solution to work.
Reputation
One respondent to the Joint Partnership survey commented the Air Force has overstepped boundaries with respect to Cyber. The Air Force attempt to create a Cyber Command was reported in many places as an attempted "land grab" to justify increased funding and manpower. 13 There are people who believe the Air Force has a reputation for conducting land grabs. Carl Builder, a well-known RAND Corporation analyst, wrote that the Air Force was originally forced to advocate for the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, which the Army and Navy also wished to own, simply because the ICBM was a threat to the need for manned bombers. 14 Sinister motives are often assumed whenever there is money or power to be gained yet the Air Force has been successful in the past at advocating for new mission areas. This may be another indicator the level of trust has declined between the Air Force and the rest of the Joint team.
Satisfaction with previous interactions
One of the most heavily critiqued areas in the CCDRs' survey comments was ISR.
Responses indicated frustration with a general lack of responsiveness, perceived to be due to the increasingly centralized management of ISR. Commanders whose areas of responsibility are not the Middle East have in many cases lost the ability to task their intelligence sections because they are being utilized for wartime operations in Central Command (CENTCOM). One respondent wrote that during two major war-planning exercises their intelligence section did not take part because they were tasked to support real-world operations. Most officers would agree combat operations may have to take priority over an exercise occasionally, but good intelligence is a critical component of a commander's readiness. Diverting most of the available ISR to one CCDR may be necessary but depriving nine of the ten CCDRs creates nine times more dissatisfaction than satisfaction.
Similarity
Similarity connotes the presence of common values and interests. 15 should adopt similar utility uniforms as they did with the Battle Dress Uniform. 21 It is important to realize every service brings a unique perspective to the fight, and there is great value in this approach. The challenge is that Joint warfighting requires interdependence, interdependence requires trust, and trust requires at least a certain amount of similarity.
The Cycle of Trust
This chapter focused on the factors that influence trust, which is now illustrated in a concept The cycle illustrates that all factors that influence trust must be positive for trust to develop.
The ways that the factors could be influenced are shown in a way that is greatly simplified. Joint training, for example could influence several of the factors that influence trust even though in Figure 1 , it appears to only influence performance. This simplification does not diminish the usefulness of the depiction because there is no harm in positively affecting more than one factor.
The danger is neglecting a factor which will inhibit the formation of trust. The next chapter will discuss how the ways shown in Figure 1 can improve trust within the Joint team. 
Chapter 4 Building Trust
Building trust is a complex issue. As a result, many organizations plunge into a common pitfall when considering ways to improve trust-or tackle any complex organizational change for that matter. This pitfall, called "satisficing," occurs when people consider complex problems and is the tendency to latch onto the first solution that seems satisfactory and sufficient to them.
Issues such as trust are especially susceptible to satisficing because they are difficult to measure and discussion on causes and solutions quickly becomes a matter of opinion with precious few indisputable facts to get in the way. In the Air Force, as in other services, differences of opinion are usually settled quickly because the highest ranking advocate's opinion wins. But this process often does not provide a long-term solution. Since Air Force leaders generally stay in their positions for two to four years, controversial actions taken by one leader are often overturned by the next, before they have had a chance to become part of the organizational culture. Just one example is the recent Air Force decision to remove all deployment data on officer selection briefs because it emphasizes overseas deployments over performance of jobs that contribute just as much to the Nation's defense but do not allow the opportunity to deploy (i.e. space, missile and some UAS crews). 1 Just two years ago, the deployment history was added to the officer selection brief to reinforce the Service's expeditionary nature. 2 The removal of the deployment data on officer selection briefs may help focus promotion boards on job performance and allow greater fairness to "deployed-in-place' airmen, but it also sends a message to airmen that there is no incentive to deploy and furthermore, sends a message to the Joint team that we do not value the part of the Air Force that is most similar to them.
Many of the problems that impact trust between the Air Force and the rest of the Joint team require cultural changes. The difficulty of changing culture within a complex organization
should not be underestimated. It is a difficult task, but it has been and can be successfully accomplished over a sufficient period of time. 3 Historical examples of changing military culture indicate the minimum time-horizon that should be considered before expecting to see culture change start to take hold is around 10 to 15 years. 4 In the Air Force context that means for culture change to take hold, the next three to four Chiefs of Staff must agree a specific action taken is the right solution to the problem and they must continue the effort in the same basic direction. Beyond that, most commanders at lower levels must believe in the solution and sell it to their troops if the change is to be lasting. 5 One key to selling a solution is demonstrating its effectiveness. 6 Partial solutions are risky in attempts to build trust because if the entire issue is not addressed, a partial solution will give an impression of ineffectiveness. The Cycle of Trust provides a conceptual framework that ensures the whole problem is considered with a focus on long-term solutions. This paper will now discuss some broad recommendations using the various stages of the Cycle of Trust, which can be applied to increase trust with the rest of the Joint team.
Reputation Word-of-mouth
Word-of-mouth can be an extremely powerful driver in forming people's opinions. The massive growth of the internet search engine, Google, was powered almost exclusively by people telling each other how easy to use and effective it was. 7 A military member who has had no interaction with another Service relies on people they trust to tell them what they need to know.
Word-of-mouth can spread positive as well as negative perceptions but if the general perception of others is negative, it can take generations for the perception to turn generally positive if wordof-mouth alone is relied on. This can be accelerated if other areas of the Trust Cycle are aggressively targeted to change existing perceptions.
The media also has the potential to impact reputation because of its ability to reach a wide audience with strong, influential messages. Using the media to impact reputation can be difficult as not all messages are received by the audience as intended. This was the case with the Air Force's "Above All" recruiting campaign. Its goal was to recruit by showcasing the Air Force's presence over battlefields and the critical nature of the service's missions in air, space, and cyberspace. 8 However, it was scrutinized by a variety of audiences to include lawmakers who questioned whether the ads were an illegal attempt to lobby Congress. 9 Even airmen were concerned the ads conveyed a message that the Air Force "thought it was better than everybody else, even other services." reports. This allowed them to use the writing skills they needed for their "day job" and have a greater connection to the wing's wartime mission. 13 When wartime skills are trained often enough, it has another desirable effect. Airmen will start to find ways to improve performance of their wartime duties and a cycle of continuous improvement will begin.
If this type of model could be followed in a Joint context, the same positive results can be achieved.
Contact
Joint interaction early in careers would allow Service members to form their own opinions about the other Services.
14 As long as this interaction develops positive perceptions, it could immunize them against inaccurate or outdated opinions passed by word-of-mouth. Also, since
similarity of values and interests is a pre-condition of trust, early contact confirming similarity allows trust to begin earlier. One way this contact could be facilitated is through Joint education and training.
Expertise Joint Education
Joint education is an important way contact has been increased in the past. Exchange cadets at the Service academies and exchange students in Developmental Education programs have long
allowed the Services to demonstrate their expertise. Joint schools such as National Defense
University have created even more Joint education opportunities and the services send their best to these schools, which helps to give positive perceptions of expertise. Expanding these programs allows deliberate interaction between Joint Service members and has the potential to improve trust. 15 It's important to remember that increasing interaction will only have a positive influence if there is a positive perception of expertise gained from the interaction. Identification of training and education deficiencies shown by the ACCE staffs were discussed in Chapter 3, but similar issues were also identified 12 years earlier in 1996, when the attendees at CORONA, a regular meeting of Air Force four-star generals, said that "officers have not been able to articulate the role of airpower in the realm of Joint operations." 16 If officers are not able to articulate the role of airpower, their ability to articulate the roles of space and cyberspace power are likely even worse. Again, trust is not gained without positive perceptions of expertise.
Air Force officers are unlikely to have a career which allows them firsthand expertise in air, space and cyberspace. The first time they will be exposed to all three domains is generally at the operational level of war. Since interaction between the services also happens mainly at the operational level, assignments at operational-level organizations such as Air Operations Centers (AOC) may be the most important and may be underemphasized in force development.
There are reasons to emphasize this development earlier in an officer's career as well.
Recent studies have found officers who deal with operational or strategic-level issues must use cognitive functions that are different from those used at the tactical level, and these cognitive functions are simply not present in everyone. 17 Even if those functions are present in youth, if not used as a person ages, they degrade. This means senior officers who spend most of their careers at the tactical level may simply be too old to learn operational art if they haven't had any education, training or experience in it. 18 There are good examples of programs designed to teach operational art and strategy. The The fact that the Air Force Office of Lessons Learned still identifies training and education shortfalls at the operational level indicates a need for even more people to be able to competently perform these duties. Expanding an existing program is often the easiest answer to an increased need, but a year-long course may be both too expensive and more than is actually required.
Producing large numbers of people who can perform well-defined duties may be better accomplished with training.
Performance Joint Training
The Air Force has made drastic improvement to its training programs this past year by 
Satisfaction Joint Warfighting Experience
While the focus of this paper has been mainly on people issues such as improving relationships and building trust, it is also important to address the Air Force's ability to provide capabilities to the Joint team. As in the used car salesman analogy used in the beginning of the paper, a good salesman selling shoddy merchandise will not keep either cognitive or affective trust for long. Capabilities were the focus of the CCDR Joint Partnership survey and the lowestscoring categories included Command and Control (C2), ISR, Operational-Level Planning, and Cyber. These areas are similar in many respects-they are inherently Joint (or even governmentwide). Perhaps with the exception of Cyber, which is doctrinally a new area, these areas are all somewhere behind the "pointy end of the spear" which makes developing warrior ethos an issue.
Careers in these areas are not considered stereotypical "war fighting" jobs. However, in the words of Carl Builder, a well known author and analyst for the RAND corporation, "While many soldiers express concern about the balance between teeth and tail in their armies, the teeth are now more than sharp enough; it is the tail that marks the difference between world-class armies and local militias." 22 for weight of effort for each of the areas on the graph. The RAF also found that even more important than budgeting the correct amount of money, innovative people must be retained to drive maximum performance in each of these areas. 23 Keeping the most innovative people could be seen as a hedge against uncertainty because people who can adapt quickly will be able to make the best use of the equipment at hand.
Figure 2 RAF Strategy Study
During the lengthy, public and politicized debate of how many F-22s the Air Force requires, a member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an influential Washington think tank said, "The Air Force is seen as a 'life support system' for the F-22." 24 Clearly this statement can be disputed but the popular perception is that the U.S. Air Force is out of balance just as the RAF now believes it is. The Air Force may need to build capability in some areas and sacrifice capability in others to maximize Joint warfighting efforts.
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